Jaish-e-Mohammad's New Playbook: How Proxy Modules Fuel Low-Visibility Terror

An Intelligence Bureau official said that a proxy module is one where the involvement of the terror group’s command is limited, and the members of the module would be doing most of the work, with the terror group stepping in only at crunch moments, such as providing expertise.

The involvement of the terror group would not be from start to end.

The manner in which the Faridabad module operated makes it clear that it worked largely on its own. This included setting up the module, radicalisation, recruitment, arranging for the ammunition and even the logistics.

The module at Faridabad could be termed as either Jaish-e-Mohammad-inspired or linked, said an official.

The Jaish’s role in the module was limited to setting up and functioning of the module. The basic propaganda material was provided by the terror group. Further, there was limited interaction between the top command of the terror outfit and the members of the module.

The Jaish stepped in to provide a handler when it came to giving assistance about preparing the explosives, another official said.

An Intelligence Bureau official said that the country would increasingly witness this trend in future. Had this module not been busted, the ISI would hoped that similar modules would come up in the rest of the country at a rapid pace.

For Pakistan, such modules suit its narrative. It does not have to provide funds, as these self-inspired proxy modules would have arranged for the money. Further, it gives Pakistan the deniability factor, while also ensuring that acts of terror continue unabated in India.

This also has to do with the fact that the Narendra Modi government changed its doctrine on terror.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, the Modi government changed its doctrine, whereby it decided to consider an act of terror not as a cross-border strike, but as an act of war.

With such modules mushrooming, Pakistan can classify terror incidents as an internal incident.

Another official said that similar modules were to be replicated in Jammu and Kashmir as well. The infiltrations have become hard, and the ISI has failed to revive homegrown terror groups such as the Hizbul Mujahideen. It had hoped that the likes of Mufti Irfan Ahmed would pick the youth and radicalise them, following which they would be recruited into a fully homegrown module that has no direct association with terror groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba or the Jaish.

The security agencies have analysed and understood this risk. They say that the problem mainly lies with the large-scale propaganda that is on. This is an issue that has been tackled on a war footing, as this is the main reason why there are inspired and proxy modules that are coming up.

Officials say that this is more or less on the model that the Islamic State set up when it came to lone wolf terrorists. It was only the propaganda that the Islamic State put out. The rest of the work was all done by the lone wolf who was inspired by such propaganda. The same is happening with modules such as the one that was busted in Faridabad.

Although this module was busted and major terror attacks were averted, groups such as the Jaish would once again push their agenda in specific parts of the country so that more such self-inspired proxy modules come up.

Another issue that is associated with such modules it comprises white-collared criminals. These persons are educated, intelligent, capable of handling the dark web and have the resources to raise funds for terror attacks in addition to procuring the wherewithal for it.

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- IANS