Pakistan's Military Strategy Fails to Solve 77-Year Balochistan Crisis, Report Finds

Covering Pakistan's southwestern frontier, Balochistan accounts for nearly 44 per cent of the country's total land area while housing only about 6 per cent of its population. It is both Pakistan's most impoverished province and one of its most resource-rich, endowed with vast reserves of natural gas, copper, gold, and strategically significant ports.

This stark contrast lies at the centre of the enduring conflict. Critics have long alleged that Islamabad benefits from Balochistan's natural wealth while local communities remain underdeveloped. Natural gas extracted from the province supplies other parts of Pakistan, yet many Baloch settlements reportedly continue to lack reliable electricity, the report noted.

Tensions between Balochistan and the Pakistani state date back to independence. In 1947, as British India was partitioned, Balochistan existed as a princely state under the Khan of Kalat. He declared independence on August 15, 1947, the same day India and Pakistan emerged as sovereign nations. Pakistan did not recognise this claim and formally annexed Balochistan in 1948.

Violence has resurfaced periodically since then. On January 31 this year, coordinated attacks across nearly a dozen cities in Balochistan left more than 30 civilians and 18 law enforcement personnel dead. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) demonstrated what observers described as sophisticated coordination across Pakistan's largest province. Security forces subsequently reported killing more than 150 fighters.

A day after the attacks, Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti stated: "The answer lies with the military rather than political dialogue." Balochistan has witnessed intermittent insurgencies since 1948, making the current unrest the fifth major rebellion in seventy-seven years. Each uprising has been countered with force, declared "suppressed," and eventually followed by another, often larger, wave of resistance.

Earlier insurgencies took place in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. According to the report, each cycle has followed a similar trajectory: grievances accumulate, protests intensify, the state responds with force, violence escalates, military operations restore a degree of order, and the core issues remain unresolved. "The pattern is clear. The lesson, apparently, is not," it observed.

The present insurgency differs in composition, described as younger, more middle-class and increasingly including women in leadership roles. Armed groups now frame their campaign as a "national liberation" struggle against colonial-style exploitation.

The report says Pakistan is intensifying security deployments rather than addressing issues of revenue-sharing or local participation. The province is now heavily militarised, yet major attacks continue.

Abdul Basit of Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies highlighted the geographic challenge, noting that Balochistan's rugged terrain spans an area larger than Germany, with sparse populations and mountainous areas that provide refuge for armed groups.

"Can you deploy security in a province this large, with such terrain, to ensure complete eradication of violence?" he asked. "Especially when the state refuses to look at local faultlines?" He suggested that while geography complicates suppression, failure to address root causes makes resolution even more elusive.

Saher Baloch, a Berlin-based scholar, argued that local familiarity with terrain provides insurgents with an advantage. "Fighters know terrain better than security forces. They need only strike occasionally to expose vulnerabilities. Where the state rules through fear rather than trust, intelligence dries up. People don't cooperate, and that's why even high security zones get breached," she said.

The issue of enforced disappearances remains particularly contentious. Activists allege that thousands have been abducted, with some later found dead bearing signs of torture.

The government denies involvement. Regardless of responsibility, the report suggests the impact is radicalising communities. Families of the disappeared, along with wider social networks, increasingly view the state with hostility.

Rafiullah Kakar, a Cambridge doctoral candidate specialising in Balochistan, argued that Pakistan must "fundamentally shift" away from "coercive and militarised" approaches.

"The starting point must be meaningful confidence-building measures for political reconciliation and dialogue," he said.

Kakar proposed steps including addressing enforced disappearances, ensuring credible political representation, establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and creating mechanisms to tackle "longstanding political, economic, and governance-related grievances."

Acknowledging abuses, creating accountability structures, enabling affected communities to participate in governance and implementing benefit-sharing frameworks for resource extraction are commonly cited elements of successful conflict resolution, the report notes.

It draws parallels with conflicts in Northern Ireland, Indonesia's Aceh province, Sri Lanka, and Colombia, arguing that military action may curb violence temporarily, but sustainable peace requires political settlements addressing underlying grievances.

"The pattern across these cases is clear: military operations can suppress violence temporarily, but sustainable stability requires political settlements addressing root grievances. Where resource-rich regions feel exploited by central governments, benefit-sharing mechanisms matter. Where communities face state violence, accountability and truth-telling matter. Where populations feel excluded from governance, genuine representation matters," the report states.

The key question, it suggests, is whether Pakistan will adopt approaches that have proven effective elsewhere or persist with strategies that have not delivered lasting peace.

Reflecting on seventy-seven years of recurring unrest, the report argues that repeated reliance on force indicates a deeper issue in how the conflict is framed.

"The Chief Minister's statement that 'the solution lies with the military' reflects a particular framing of the problem. If Balochistan is primarily a security threat, then security responses make sense. But if it's fundamentally a political conflict about resource distribution, governance, representation, and historical grievances, then security responses, however well-executed, can only manage symptoms, not resolve causes," it said.

Following the January 31 attacks, the BLA described its actions as resistance to colonial exploitation and a pursuit of national liberation.

The report notes that irrespective of whether that characterisation is accepted, the fact that segments of the population find it persuasive enough to support or refrain from opposing armed movements underscores a legitimacy challenge for the state.

"Legitimacy can't be imposed through force alone. It has to be earned through governance that people find responsive to their needs and respectful of their voice," the report stated, adding that nearly eight decades of conflict suggest current methods have not secured that legitimacy.

While acknowledging that abandoning security operations entirely is neither practical nor advisable amid active violence, the report concludes that Pakistan faces a strategic choice: continue treating Balochistan primarily as a security issue with occasional political engagement, or reframe it as fundamentally a political issue requiring consistent political solutions alongside calibrated security measures.

Though the distinction may appear subtle, the report argues the implications are profound. Based on the response to the latest wave of attacks, it suggests Pakistan appears inclined to follow the path it has taken for decades. Whether a potential sixth rebellion prompts a shift in thinking remains uncertain.

- IANS