Forty-one doors, one resilient system: how India kept pumps and kitchens running without Hormuz or through Hormuz disruption
By G. Krishnakumar, New Delhi, June 29
A refinery does not care about geopolitics. It cares about the crude in its tanks, the slate it can run, and whether the next cargo will berth on time. That operational truth became India's test during the hundred days of the Hormuz disruption. When a chokepoint that normally carried more than 40% of India's crude imports, over 80% of LPG imports and more than 55% of LNG imports suddenly became unreliable, the question inside every operations room was brutally practical: would the molecules keep arriving, and would citizens see the difference at the pump, in the kitchen or at the CNG station? They did not. Not a single retail outlet ran dry. Household LPG, PNG and CNG supplies were protected throughout. That is the real story of the crisis: resilience built quietly in calm years, spent with discipline in a hard one.
The first line of defence was sourcing breadth. An importing country with two or three suppliers is a hostage to each of them; an importing country with 41 is a negotiator. India had widened its crude supplier base from 27 countries in 2006-07 to 41 today, and that breadth alone allowed non-Hormuz sourcing to rise from roughly 55% to about 70% once the Strait was disrupted. Barrels were replaced by cargoes from Russia, the Atlantic basin, the Americas and West Africa--bought on terms that only years of prior relationships could make possible.
You cannot build a supplier base in a fortnight; you can only draw on the one you spent a decade assembling. The contrast with India's Asian peers was instructive: China cut crude imports by 45%, Southeast Asian refiners slashed throughput, and Japan and South Korea leaned heavily on strategic reserves. India maintained refinery runs at full capacity and ended the disruption with inventory intact--a divergence that reflects not March 2026 but the sourcing architecture built patiently over the decade before.
The same optionality applied to LPG, the tightest commodity. With more than 80% of LPG normally transiting Hormuz, cooking gas was where a shortage would have been felt first and resented most. The LPG Control Order of 8 March directed refineries to maximise yields, lifting domestic production from 35 TMT/day to 54 TMT/day--a turnaround possible only in a system with real operating headroom. The 22 LPG import terminals now operating, against 11 in 2014, gave India alternative entry points that did not exist a decade ago. The household cylinder was protected throughout. The price to an Ujjwala beneficiary was held at Rs 642 while the global market convulsed, even as the import-linked cost exceeded Rs 1,600 per cylinder.
Refining flexibility was the second structural asset. Indian refineries are built for variety, configured over successive upgrade cycles to process a wide range of grades. When the cheap and familiar Gulf barrels stopped arriving, the units changed their menu. Every PSU refiner maintained throughput at 100% without a single shutdown. Stocks of petrol, diesel and aviation turbine fuel never fell below a 60-day cover. Not one refinery requested a run-cut.
Natural gas held equally firm. PNG and CNG consumers experienced zero disruption throughout; total supply recovered to 96% of pre-war levels by June through alternate LNG sourcing and cross-ministry coordination. As a structural bonus, the PNG 2.0 drive tripled new daily household connections--each one permanently reducing dependence on imported LPG.
I want to be candid about the cost, because a supply story without its price tag is propaganda. Keeping the pump price stable while Brent ran from about US$70 to roughly US$126 a barrel meant somebody absorbed the difference. The oil marketing companies carried losses of Rs 61,000 crore in the first quarter alone, on top of Rs 30,000 crore committed the prior year to hold cooking-gas prices.
The government's excise duty cut held the consumer-facing damage to that amount rather than passing it to household budgets--a deliberate choice to take the shock onto the public balance sheet, and the clearest expression of what a consumer-first energy policy means when tested.
India's preparedness extended beyond crude procurement. Strategic petroleum reserves, increased commercial inventories, flexible refinery configurations capable of processing multiple crude grades, and robust shipping arrangements provided additional layers of resilience. Together, these measures enabled India to absorb temporary disruptions without affecting domestic fuel availability.
There is a tendency, when a crisis is navigated well, to assume it was therefore easy. Both conclusions are wrong. The disruption was the most severe the modern energy system has faced, and the reason it did not translate into queues and dark forecourts is that resilience had been built in advance and operated with discipline. The question now is whether this becomes an archived episode or the baseline for a structural upgrade. India holds only 9.5 days of strategic crude reserves; commercial stocks filled the gap this time, but the next disruption may not offer that window.
Expanding strategic petroleum reserves to Bikaner and Bina, establishing a ring-fenced Energy Security Fund, advancing the Oman-Gujarat deepwater pipeline to financing, operationalising the SCI-IOCL-BPCL-ONGC joint fleet of 62 owned vessels, and capping any single supply region at under 40% of imports would all materially strengthen the architecture for whatever comes next.
India's experience offers an important lesson for energy-importing nations: diversification is not merely a procurement strategy--it is a strategic investment in national energy security. By structurally breaking a decades-long reliance on the Strait of Hormuz and cultivating a diversified, global import portfolio, India navigated the 2026 energy crisis effectively. The strategic pivot proved that modern energy security requires agility, robust long-term contracting, and the willingness to look far beyond geographic proximity.
Resilience is bought in the calm years and spent in the hard ones. The 41-country supplier base, the configurable refineries, the 22 import terminals and the 20% ethanol blending programme were none of them built for this emergency. They were built for resilience as a principle, and the emergency came and proved the principle sound.
A country that had built 41 doors did not panic when one was blocked. It used the others, kept its kitchens lit and its pumps wet, and absorbed the worst energy crisis in modern history as a few weeks of headlines and no change in daily life. The 41 doors held. The question is how many more will have been built by the time they are needed again. (ANI)
Disclaimer: G. Krishnakumar is the ex-Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited. The views expressed in this article are his own
— ANI
Reader Comments
The 41-door analogy is brilliant and so true! But as a taxpayer, Rs 61,000 crore loss is mind-boggling. While I appreciate the stability, questions need to be asked about why we are still so dependent on a single chokepoint after decades of warnings. We got lucky this time with alternatives, but next disruption might not have the same outcome.
As someone who runs a small transport business, the fact that diesel never ran out was a huge relief. But I think the government should publish some of these figures earlier, not after the crisis. The public deserves to know when we are vulnerable and when we are safe. Still, hats off to the planners who built this resilience over a decade. 👏
What struck me most was the contrast with China cutting imports by 45%. We bashed China all the time, but here India stood firm while others scrambled! The LPG story especially impressed me - 4 crore Ujjwala beneficiaries getting cylinders at Rs 642 while global price was Rs 1,600+. That's what development with compassion looks like. 🇮🇳
Impressive operational details. As an energy analyst from the US, I find India's strategy particularly remarkable because it wasn't about one big solution but many small ones - 22 import terminals, 41 suppliers, flexible refineries, strategic reserves. The lesson for all importing nations is clear: diversification isn't just procurement, it's survival. The question now is how quickly they can expand that strategic reserve beyond 9.5 days.
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